

4:14–34; Acts 13:15, 15:21, 17:2; 1 Tim 4:13) as well as the need to internalize its instructions (e.g., Deut 6:6–9, 11:18–21), all this in order to act upon the basis of conviction rather than coercion. Finally, Lanni argues that, even if the ancient Athenian “courts did not predictably and reliably enforce statutes,” still “these laws had a symbolic force that operated as a significant influence on everyday behavior” (118). Again, we find a parallel to ancient Israel, where the ideal was to have the law written on one’s heart rather than being enforced by social control.

In this way, I find Lanni’s book instructive for biblical studies on how Torah might have functioned in ancient Israel, as well as giving us a fascinating glimpse into ancient Athens. In addition, while our modern cultures are very different, they nevertheless draw from both ancient Israel and Athens. Therefore, it may be very instructive to reflect on how these societies sought to maintain peace and order differently than we do.

Vesterålen, Norway

KENNETH BERGLAND

Loose, Jonathan J., Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland, eds. *The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism*. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018. xiv + 511 pp. Hardcover. USD 195.00.

*The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism* was put together to promote discussion on the nature of humans and their mental states—specifically views under the umbrella of substance dualism in a broad sense as well as critiques of these views from a variety of perspectives. The open intent of its organizers is “to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the various positions and their critics” (1). The work was edited by Jonathan J. Loose (senior lecturer in philosophy and psychology at Heythrop College, University of London), Angus J. L. Menuge (professor of philosophy at Concordia University Wisconsin and president of the Evangelical Philosophical Society), and J. P. Moreland (professor of philosophy at Talbot School of Theology, Biola University).

The volume contains thirty-two articles written by twenty-nine contributors. After two introductory articles, the remaining ones are organized into three parts: first, “Articulating Substance Dualism”; second, “Alternatives to Substance Dualism,” and, third, “Substance Dualism, Theology, and the Bible.” Each of these parts is further divided into subsections, each containing two or three articles that debate a given topic from different perspectives so as to allow readers to “decide for themselves where the better arguments lie” (1). In part one, the debates are on emergent dualism, Thomistic dualism, Cartesian dualism, the unity of consciousness, and near-death experiences. In part two, authors debate animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitution-

alism, and emergent individualism. In part three, the debates are on biblical anthropology, the incarnation, and the resurrection.

The main strength of the volume is its philosophical approach, as can be seen from the expertise of the editors and the methods utilized by most contributors. Articulating the nature of humans and of the human mind from a variety of philosophical stances gives readers a wealth of perspectives on the subject matter. A second asset of this companion is that it allows each topic of discussion to be dealt with from different and often opposing viewpoints. Thus, even though the volume is openly trying to support substance dualism, each of its favorable positions on any given topic is balanced by one contrary article. In this sense, readers are given the benefit of alternate proposals and solutions, though the number of articles favoring dualism is somewhat greater than those challenging it (nineteen to thirteen). A third positive observation, which I noticed sprinkled here and there throughout the book, is that while trying to make their case in a persuasive manner, some authors show an awareness that evidence alone does not suffice to make the case either way. As Gary Habermas puts it, “the real, underlying issue in these matters is very frequently *not* about straightforward dialogues regarding where the best evidence lies, but is more about a momentous clash of worldviews” (243). William Lycan (22, 34n3), Nancy Murphy (322–323), and Angus Menuge (394), to different degrees, also seem to be aware of, or acknowledge, the impact of worldviews (and the assumptions embedded in them) on the interpretation of reality. I find this recognition helpful in studying human nature and the philosophy of mind because it points to a more realistic approach to these issues and warns readers against the naïve belief that data by itself is enough to convince people one way or another.

Given the Judeo-Christian theistic perspectives of most contributors and the editors’ intent to advance theism against naturalism (1, 10–11), some may perceive the volume’s modest interaction with and articulation of biblical material (only six of thirty-two articles deal more directly with biblical content, although several others do it tangentially) as a limitation. But this is not necessarily a weakness of this companion in comparison with other studies. It rather represents a wider phenomenon in the field of Christian philosophy and systematic theology where the interaction with biblical scholarship is minimal. Within this methodology, the contribution of biblical data and concepts in context of the ANE is not sufficiently influential in the development of anthropologies. This is a major disadvantage as it limits research and tends to lock the debate down to philosophical and/or systematic categories, often within the bandwidth of classical philosophy. For these reasons, among others, I will comment on the underrepresented category of biblical material and more specifically on the two articles that attempt to engage with the issue of human nature from a biblical perspective.

John W. Cooper, author of the article “Biblical Anthropology Is Holistic and Dualistic,” advocates biblical anthropology as dualistic because “although God created and redeems humans as embodied persons, he sustains us disembodied between death and bodily resurrection”—and holistic because “the person-body dichotomy [is] an abnormal and diminished condition” (415). In his interaction with biblical scholars Joel B. Green and N. T. Wright, Cooper asserts that all three of them affirm holism, and that therefore “holism is not at issue” (413). When assessing Green’s and Wright’s critiques of dualism, however, Cooper feels that their objections are anachronistic (because they critique historical, instead of contemporary dualistic articulations) and inaccurate (because they fail to consider *wholistic* dualists). In order to advance his case, Cooper uses the following strategy: he attempts to define terms more narrowly and assesses OT anthropology in creation (Gen 2:7), the afterlife in the OT, and then anthropology and eschatology in Second Temple Judaism, closing with NT anthropology and eschatology.

A helpful contribution Cooper makes to the discussion is a call for more precise terminology, especially in regards to the distinction between monism and holism, since the two terms are often used interchangeably, which can create confusion (though the biblical data seem to defy the familiar categories “monism” and “dualism,” as we will see below). Another significant observation I can agree with is Cooper’s insistence that the biblical creation text in Gen 2:7 indicates “two basic ingredients from which God makes a *nephesh chayah* [a living being],” namely, “*neshamah* [breath] and dirt” (417). This appears to be an accurate description of the Genesis creation account. However—and now I turn to my critiques—I do not share Cooper’s conclusion. For him, “this text therefore expresses generic dualism.” Such a leap requires assuming that the breath (or spirit) is a conscious, thinking, and somewhat operational person just lacking embodiment—an assumption not provided by the text. It is presupposed by Cooper, and it determines his conclusion. If one follows the narrative without this prior commitment, the account seems to suggest that consciousness and action result from the combination of the breath and the body (dust of the ground). Only after this unity of “ingredients” occurs do we have human existence and activity. In the creation narrative, living human beings are a third reality different from and greater than the sum of the two initial ingredients. Thus, when drawing data from the Genesis creation account alone, the phenomenon of human life can be described as some sort of emergent wholism, but not “generic dualism” as Cooper proposes. Cooper then applies the same dualistic reading to other biblical texts from which he tries to establish afterlife “subsistence.” This is the idea that permeates Cooper’s entire article. As he puts it, “the decisive issue is whether persons subsist after death” (418). But a more decisive issue for Cooper may be whether his assumption about the nature of the spirit/breath is justified. Cooper’s interpretation is also colored by some genre and

style oversight, as well as a bit of neglect of the organic nature of anthropological metaphors (see Green, op. cit. below). Without them and without the prior commitment to afterlife subsistence, the texts Cooper analyses can be explained in other ways. Finally, Cooper generally analyses passages that only indirectly deal with human nature. For instance, he does not go over texts like Eccl 12:7, which discusses death—the disassembling of the ingredients for life (“and the dust returns to the earth as it was, and the spirit returns to God who gave it,” ESV; though here we do not have *neshemah*, but “its synonym *ruach*” [417]; see Gen 7:22 for a combined form). In its intratextual context, Eccl 12:7 does not entail dualism, for each ingredient by itself is not operational (see Eccl 9:5–6, 10). Hence, while Cooper brings important observations and clarifications to the discussion of human nature, his choice of texts is not optimum, and his dualistic interpretation is more the result of a precommitment to human subsistence in an intermediary state (Christian tradition) than a necessary conclusion from interpreting biblical passages in their proper loci (in context).

Joel B. Green in “The Strange Case of the Vanishing Soul” documents the decline of the translation “soul” for the word *ψυχή* in English Bibles from thirty-nine occurrences back in the 1611 KJV to three in the 2011 CEB. According to Green, the phenomenon results from Bible linguists’ gradual forsaking of the popular English usage of “soul” “where it usually refers to an immaterial, immortal part of a human” and the adoption of terms that are more sensitive to the Greek nuances of *ψυχή* which refer to the various aspects of human life such as “person,” “life,” “inner person,” etc. (428). He explains the decline of the usage of the term “soul” in three ways: first, dualist tendencies brought into the NT text interpretation by theological and philosophical traditions have been greatly challenged by historical research focused on the first-century background of the NT; second, sociocultural perceptions have conditioned Western readers’ understanding of human nature, and these cultural perceptions, in turn, are “read . . . back into” NT texts; third, “rereading . . . New Testament texts that served previously as taken-for-granted illustrations of the New Testament’s anthropological dualism” (429). Green has done this elsewhere. In this article he rereads 1 Peter, which contains the word *ψυχή* six times. He notes that 1 Peter does not contain Philo’s “references to body and soul as discrete human essences,” or to the “soul’s sovereignty over the body,” or to “the body as a tent or shrine in which the soul might dwell” (435). The only dualism Green finds in 1 Peter is eschatological (“life in this world versus life in the age to come,” [436]), and concludes that “Peter’s anthropology is . . . twice embodied—bodily life . . . indivisible in terms of a person’s essential unity, but also full-bodied life among a people called to follow Christ’s example” (437). I appreciate Green’s documentation of the decline of the use of the word “soul” in recent translations as well as the reasons he gives for the phenomenon, though I am not so sure this is not also

influenced by “the natural sciences in the modern era,” as he suggests. To his credit, I concede that such influence does not detract from his exposition. I also welcome Green’s sensitivity to the powerful role of presuppositions in interpreting texts (430).

On the book as a whole, I agree with the editors that *The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism* is a “valuable resource for scholars in a variety of disciplines (notably, philosophy of mind, psychology, and theological anthropology) and a useful reference for those interested in doing further work advancing the case for or against substance dualism” (11).

Adventist University of São Paulo

FLAVIO PRESTES III

Van der Merwe, Christo H., Jacobus A. Naudé, and Jan H. Kroeze, eds. *Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar*. 2nd ed. New York: T&T Clark, 2017. 640 pp. Softcover. USD 43.16.

It has been a long wait for this significantly updated popular *Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar* that first appeared in 1999 from Sheffield Academic Press. The first edition of this grammar was particularly popular among Bible translators but was also well received by students of biblical Hebrew and exegetes. The quality of its content was warranted by the academic quality of its authors. Particularly, van der Merwe’s work and research groups are well known in the field. His close work with Bible societies and Bible translation predestined him, together with Naudé and Kroeze, to write a grammar that shines as a reference tool for all those that work with biblical Hebrew on a regular basis. Today, a digital version of both the first and this second edition are available in Logos Bible Software and help to advance the exegetical workflow.

Now, after eighteen years, the grammar has been updated by an additional 236 pages (current total of 640 pages), that is, more than 50 percent of the total page number of the first edition (404 pages). This amplification is caused by the integration of insights that were generated through the linguistic research of the last 10 years: Andrason (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013), Oakes (2011), Cook (2012), Joosten (2012), Miller-Naude & Zevit (2012), Kahn (2013), Schniedewind (2013), van der Merwe (2013, 2014), Holmstedt (2014), Jones (2014), Rezetko & Young (2014), Lamprecht (2015), Naude (2015, 2016), Bivin (2017).

Despite the massive updates, this edition still functions as a reference grammar (and this is good!) and lacks features that come with comprehensive grammars like the one of Joüon-Muraoka. But one can state firmly that this latest edition is the most up-to-date Hebrew grammar on the market and will be one of the most important reference works for Hebrew in the next decade.